130+ Military Frequencies, a Dead Satellite, and a Five-Country Spy Pipeline
How Venezuela's Entire Military Communications Architecture Is Documented in Open Sources — and Why HF Radio Was the Only Thing That Survived the US Operation
What You’re About to Read
This is not about hacking radios. This is about what happens when a country builds its entire military communications infrastructure with foreign technology — Chinese satellites, Chinese radars, Chinese telecom equipment, Russian missiles, Iranian boats — and then watches all of it fail in a single night.
Early March 2026, I compiled the most comprehensive open-source map of Venezuela’s military communications ever assembled. Every HF frequency. Every ALE call sign. Every satellite transponder. Every ground station coordinate. Every naval vessel with its radio identifier. Every air defense radar that failed. Every intelligence pipeline that connects Caracas to Havana to Beijing.
I did this using publicly available databases, open-source monitoring communities, declassified reports, government websites, GitHub repositories, and cross-referencing with ODINT’s existing Venezuela investigation data.
What emerged is a picture of a military that is simultaneously surveilled by its own allies and deaf to its own chain of command.
Part 1: The HF Radio Backbone
Venezuela’s military runs on High Frequency radio. Not as a backup — as the backbone.
The Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana (FANB) operates across six military regions, each with a Regional Command Center (CRC). Long-range command and control between these regions uses HF bands (3-30 MHz) with Automatic Link Establishment (ALE) — a protocol that automatically selects the best frequency for a given link, identifies stations by call sign, and logs every connection attempt.
I documented:
45+ Army HF frequencies across 5 infantry divisions plus the General Staff
70+ Navy HF frequencies covering all maritime operations
50+ Army ALE identifiers — call signs mapped to specific units, bases, and command elements
80+ Navy ALE identifiers — including individual ship call signs for 25+ vessels
4 documented ALE networks — Riverine HQ, Riverine Forces, Coast Guard, and Riverine Ops
3 cross-branch shared frequencies — 7849.0, 10272.0, and 10600.0 kHz
Those three shared frequencies are the critical finding. Army, Navy, and National Guard all communicate on them. Monitor one branch, hear all three.
Cross-Branch Shared Frequencies
7849.0 kHz — shared Army/Navy/GNB
10272.0 kHz — shared Army/Navy/GNB
10600.0 kHz — shared Army/Navy/GNB
Army General Staff / C2 Frequencies
7849.0 kHz
8060.0 kHz
9795.0 kHz
10272.0 kHz
10600.0 kHz
Key Army ALE Identifiers
MIRA1, MIRA2, MIRA3 — Presidential Palace (Miraflores) military command elements
CUFAN divisions 1-6 — Personnel, Intel, Ops, Logistics, Civil Affairs, C2
DIVSUP — Division of Supply
REGCOM1-6 — Regional Commands 1 through 6
The ALE identifiers are equally valuable. Each call sign maps to a specific unit or vessel. When “DIVSUP” connects to “REGCOM3” on 8060.0 kHz, you know the Division of Supply is contacting Regional Command 3. When “PCGFLU” transmits, that’s a Coast Guard river patrol. When “FRALUI” calls in, that’s the frigate Almirante Brion — Mariscal Sucre class, Venezuela’s only missile frigate.
Every one of these frequencies is monitorable with consumer-grade equipment. An SDR dongle, a wire antenna, and a laptop anywhere in the Caribbean can intercept HF communications across the entire Venezuelan military.
And after January 3, 2026, these frequencies were the designed fallback when everything else went dark — though even HF may have been disrupted during the operation.
Part 2: The Satellite Is Dead
VeneSat-1, the Simón Bolívar satellite, was Venezuela’s crown jewel — a $390 million Chinese-built communications satellite launched in October 2008 from Xichang, China. It carried 28 transponders: 14 C-band, 12 Ku-band, and 2 Ka-band (exclusive to Venezuelan territory). It provided television broadcasting, military internet, government broadband, and remote area connectivity.
In February 2020, the first solar array drive mechanism failed. In March, the second one failed. Total power loss. The satellite began tumbling uncontrolled. An emergency burn to raise it to a graveyard orbit only half-worked — the apogee burn succeeded but the perigee burn failed, likely because it ran out of power mid-maneuver. VeneSat-1 now tumbles in an elliptical orbit roughly 50 km above normal geostationary altitude, drifted 30 degrees west of its assigned slot.
It is space debris. $390 million of space debris.
VeneSat-1 Technical Details
Known active transponder (pre-death): 3886 MHz, vertical polarization, SR 23000
Beacon frequency: 11700V
Post-death replacement (active): Intelsat 35e, 34.5 W, 11110 MHz, DVB-S2 (FTA Venezuela)
State media (active): Intelsat 14, 45 W, C-band
What Venezuela lost:
All 28 transponders — permanently
Ku-band military internet (CANTV Satelital broadband for military, health, education, electoral council, security, public admin)
Ka-band Venezuela-exclusive communications — no replacement planned
The only sovereign communications satellite Venezuela ever had
What Venezuela did next:
On March 24, 2020, at 13:13 EST — eleven days after declaring the satellite dead — the Venezuelan government transferred its broadcasting to American Intelsat 14 at 45 degrees West, C-band. VTV, TVes, Telesur, Vive TV, seven Radio Nacional channels, and Miraflores FM (the presidential palace radio station) — all migrated to an American satellite.
An anti-American regime broadcasting its propaganda through American satellite infrastructure. You cannot make this up.
By November 2021, CONATEL launched “FTA Venezuela” — free satellite TV on Intelsat 35e (34.5 degrees West, 11110 MHz, DVB-S2). Forty-three channels including state media, some private channels, and radio stations.
But the Ku-band military internet was NOT transferred. The Ka-band transponders are permanently lost. Venezuela’s military lost its satellite communications capability entirely, with no announced replacement.
This makes the HF radio network the single most important communications system in the Venezuelan military. The 130+ frequencies documented in this investigation aren’t legacy holdovers — they’re the primary long-range command and control channel for a nuclear-armed country’s worth of military infrastructure.
Part 3: The Ground Stations Inside Military Bases
Venezuela operates two satellite ground stations, both built by China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC) and handed over December 1, 2008.
Baemari / El Sombrero (Primary):
Location: Base Aerea Militar Capitan Manuel Rios, El Sombrero, Guarico state
Coordinates: 9.3563 degrees N, 66.9131 degrees W
Inside a military airbase — dual military/space facility
Operates the Satellite Control Center and Operations Management System
Also controls VRSS-2 remote sensing satellite (launched 2017, possibly still operational)
Luepa (Backup):
Location: Fort Manikuya, Bolivar state, southeastern Venezuela
Backup control station
Exact coordinates not publicly documented
Ground Station Coordinates
Baemari (Primary): 9.3563 N, 66.9131 W — inside Base Aerea Militar Capitan Manuel Rios, El Sombrero, Guarico
Luepa (Backup): Fort Manikuya, Bolivar state
The problem: China built the entire Operations Management System. Chinese personnel trained all Venezuelan technicians. According to the Washington Post, China may retain remote access to these ground stations even without physical presence. The House Select Committee on China identified 11 PRC-linked ground stations across Latin America with “dual-use military applications” — Baemari is one of them.
Venezuela has zero independent satellite capability. Every satellite was Chinese-built, Chinese-launched, from Chinese launch sites. China knows the architecture because China IS the architecture.
Part 4: Air Defense — The Paper Tiger
Venezuela’s Integrated Air Defense System (SINODAM/SINDA) is an integrated network of Chinese radars and Russian surface-to-air missiles:
Chinese Radars:
JY-27A long-range surveillance (12+ units) — CETC-manufactured
JYL-1 3D search radar
JY-1b target acquisition
Russian SAMs:
S-300VM (Antey-2500) — Venezuela’s most capable system
BUK M-2 medium-range
S-125 Pechora (legacy)
Pantsir-S1 short-range point defense
Chinese SAMs:
FK-3 (export HQ-22) medium-range
MANPADS:
Igla-S (Russian), RBS-70 (Swedish)
On paper, this is a multi-layered air defense network capable of engaging targets from low altitude to high altitude at ranges from 5 km to 200+ km.
On January 3, 2026, every single layer failed.
US Navy EA-18G Growlers deployed electronic attack that blinded every Chinese radar in the network. The JY-27A — supposedly designed to detect stealth aircraft — couldn’t see anything through the jamming. The S-300VM and BUK M-2 batteries weren’t even connected to their engagement radars when the attack began. Anti-radiation missiles (likely AGM-88E AARGM) destroyed radar emitters that attempted to activate.
Air Defense Equipment Inventory
JY-27A long-range radar: 12+ units (CETC, China) — JAMMED
S-300VM SAM: unknown quantity (Russia) — NOT connected to radars during Jan 2026 attack
BUK M-2 SAM: unknown quantity (Russia) — NOT connected to radars during Jan 2026 attack
FK-3 SAM: unknown quantity (China, export HQ-22) — FAILED
Pantsir-S1 SHORAD: unknown quantity (Russia) — FAILED
All defeated by EA-18G electronic attack, January 3, 2026
$4+ billion in Russian and Chinese air defense equipment. Defeated by electronic warfare aircraft operating from a carrier group in the Caribbean.
Part 5: The Five-Country Intelligence Pipeline
This is where individual findings become a system.
China provides the technology: JY-27A radars (CETC), CANTV telecom backbone (ZTE/Huawei), CEIEC “Great Firewall” deep packet inspection, facial recognition software for SEBIN, and the Sistema Patria surveillance database.
Cuba runs analysis: ~500 Cuban military personnel serve as advisors in Venezuela. Cuban officers maintain long-term assignments at both SEBIN and DGCIM headquarters. Cuban SIGINT stations at Lourdes and Bejucal (near Havana) monitor electromagnetic activity across the Caribbean with equipment capable of triangulation over thousands of kilometers. Collected data flows to automated analysis and correlation centers in Havana. Chinese radar feeds from SINDA are shared with Cuba through these facilities.
Venezuela enforces domestically: DGCIM (military counterintelligence) monitors hundreds of military personnel simultaneously — intercepts calls, SMS, email, social media, deploys malware, runs informant networks. SEBIN runs parallel surveillance from the Helicoide complex and La Tumba (5 underground floors, cells 2x3m, permanent cameras and microphones). Both agencies use Cuban “enhanced interrogation” techniques. A Navy captain died in DGCIM custody with fractured ribs and organ damage.
Russia modernizes Cuban surveillance infrastructure and provides Venezuela with secure communications gear, electronic warfare equipment, and S-300VM missile systems.
Iran manufactures fiber optic cable through Venefibra (a joint venture with CANTV and La Guaira government) — a $10M factory in Catia la Mar, operational August 2025, with stated ambitions to export across Latin America. Iran also supplies Peykaap III fast attack craft armed with Nasr anti-ship missiles (Chinese C-704 copies).
The physical backbone: ALBA-1, a 1,630 km submarine fiber optic cable running directly from La Guaira, Venezuela to Siboney, Cuba. Owned by Telecomunicaciones Gran Caribe (60% Venezuelan state). This is the wire that carries Venezuelan intelligence data to Cuban analysis centers in Havana.
And the node that ties it together: G-Network, a telecom company founded in 2021 in La Guaira that received its CONATEL license in 4 months (normally takes years). G-Network deployed 28 km of fiber along the Caracas-La Guaira “presidential highway” using unmarked vans. Its infrastructure runs 200-500 meters from SEBIN headquarters. A SEBIN operative’s server was discovered at 38.61.255.205:5000 — a Flask/Python login portal on G-Network IP space, created by Detective Javier Ochoa, an active SEBIN officer on the UN-documented torture list. G-Network employs a Russian consultant from Volgograd State Technical University. And 5 km away, an Iranian fiber optic factory produces cable.
Five countries. One telecom infrastructure. China supplies the surveillance tech. Russia provides the personnel. Iran builds the cable. Cuba analyzes the data. SEBIN pulls the trigger.
Part 6: Operation Absolute Resolve — The Night Everything Failed
January 3, 2026. 2:00 AM local time.
US Cyber Command killed the power grid across Caracas. SCADA systems controlling Chinese-built electrical infrastructure — managed through the CANTV network — were compromised. The power went out.
At 2:01 AM — one minute later — US helicopters began landing.
The coordination between cyber and kinetic was precise to sixty seconds. Which means the SCADA access was planted long before. Months. Possibly years.
Fourteen hours before the operation, internet routing showed suspicious BGP traffic redirection — intelligence gathering that in retrospect was the opening move.
EA-18G Growlers jammed every air defense radar. Anti-radiation missiles destroyed any emitter that tried to activate. DDoS traffic overwhelmed city servers. Web services across Caracas went offline.
The entire Chinese-built communications infrastructure — CANTV, CEIEC, ZTE, Huawei — was either compromised or bypassed.
What should have survived? HF radio. The 3-30 MHz bands that propagate via ionospheric skip, require no infrastructure, and can’t be taken down by a cyber attack. In theory, HF can only be jammed within line-of-sight of the jammer — making it the most resilient C2 channel in the Venezuelan military.
However, there are claims that even HF communications were disrupted during the raid. Whether through wide-spectrum jamming from EA-18G Growlers, targeted interference, or the sheer chaos of a paralyzed command structure, the extent to which HF radio actually functioned during those critical hours remains unclear. What is clear: it was the designed fallback, and the 130+ frequencies documented here are what the Venezuelan military would have reverted to when everything modern failed. And on January 3, 2026, everything modern failed.
Part 7: What Else I Found
CANTV internal infrastructure on GitHub: The Covetel cooperative (CANTV’s workers’ cooperative) published CANTV’s email and portal architecture publicly on GitHub — Exchange server at owacorp.cantv.com.ve, SOGo mail server, PostgreSQL databases, Plone/Zope CMS with LDAP directory integration. Not credentials — but complete infrastructure mapping of Venezuela’s state telecom.
Six live CONATEL subdomains: Found through website source code analysis — sigestel, habilita, conatelenlinea, sac, registroeventos, homologa. The telecommunications regulator that monitors all broadcasts and has shut down 300+ stations exposes its own administrative infrastructure.
Hytera TETRA police radios with known backdoor: Caracas police use Hytera TETRA digital radios — PT580H handhelds, MT680 vehicle-mounted, DIB-R5 base stations. Hytera is a Shenzhen-based Chinese company. TETRA’s TEA1 encryption has a known backdoor discovered in July 2023 (TETRA:BURST vulnerability). Another Chinese company providing Venezuela’s security communications with a documented cryptographic weakness.
SEBIN infrastructure on G-Network:
SEBIN server: 38.61.255.205:5000 — Flask/Python login portal on G-Network IP space (ASN 272122)
Created by: Detective Javier Ochoa — active SEBIN officer, UN torture list
G-Network fiber: 28 km along Caracas-La Guaira presidential highway
Proximity: G-Network infrastructure 200-500m from SEBIN HQ (Plaza Venezuela)
CANTV internal infrastructure (from GitHub):
Exchange server: owacorp.cantv.com.ve
SOGo mail: sogo.cantv.com.ve
CMS: Plone/Zope with PostgreSQL backend
Directory: LDAP integration
Source: Covetel cooperative GitHub repositories (public)
Live CONATEL subdomains: sigestel.conatel.gob.ve, habilita.conatel.gob.ve, conatelenlinea.conatel.gob.ve, sac.conatel.gob.ve, registroeventos.conatel.gob.ve, homologa.conatel.gob.ve
42-ship naval fleet with Iranian missile boats: Venezuela operates 42 active vessels including Iranian-built Peykaap III fast attack craft armed with Nasr anti-ship missiles (Chinese C-704 copies, 35 km range). The boats do 50+ knots with a crew of 3. The weapons pipeline mirrors the telecom pipeline — Iran manufactures, China designs, Venezuela deploys.
Iranian Peykaap III specifications:
Length: 17.3m, beam 3.75m, draft 0.7m, displacement ~13.75 tons
Speed: 50+ knots, crew of 3
Armament: 2x Nasr anti-ship missile launchers (Chinese C-704 copy)
Nasr range: 35 km (export CM-90 variant: 90 km)
Guidance: TV + mmWave radar
IRGC-N design, North Korean-derived hull
Naval vessel ALE call signs (selected):
FRALUI — Frigate Almirante Brion (Mariscal Sucre class)
PCGFLU — Coast Guard river patrol
80+ additional Navy ALE identifiers documented
ALBA-1 submarine cable:
Length: 1,630 km direct from La Guaira, Venezuela to Siboney, Cuba
Owner: Telecomunicaciones Gran Caribe (60% Venezuelan state)
Function: Physical backbone of Venezuela-Cuba intelligence data transfer
Status during Operation Absolute Resolve: unknown if disrupted
Submarines that can’t talk underwater: Venezuela’s two Type 209/1300 submarines (Sabalo and Caribe) are reportedly non-operational and haven’t been to sea in years. Even if they were operational, Venezuela has no ELF/VLF submarine communication infrastructure. Submerged, they would be completely cut off from command. Only the US, Russia, India, and China operate ELF facilities.
Part 8: Starlink — The Regime’s Nightmare
Starlink does not officially serve Venezuela. It is one of the only Latin American countries dark on Starlink’s coverage map.
But terminals are smuggled from Colombia and Argentina. They sell on Telegram for $60 (older models) to $600+ (newest kits). People have been arrested for smuggling them. The regime attempted to criminalize possession and block Starlink-capable frequency bands.
Within 48 hours of Operation Absolute Resolve, Starlink offered free internet to all Venezuelans.
They can’t block it. They can’t jam it from the ground (the satellites are in low earth orbit, constantly moving). They can’t intercept it (encryption is end-to-end). They can’t shut it down (they don’t control the constellation). CEIEC’s Great Firewall is useless against it. CONATEL’s censorship orders don’t reach space.
For a regime that built its entire surveillance and censorship apparatus around controlling the wire — CANTV, CEIEC, CONATEL, ALBA-1 — a communications system that doesn’t use the wire is an existential threat.
Conclusion
Venezuela built its military communications on Chinese satellites, Chinese radars, Chinese telecom equipment, Russian missiles, and Iranian weapons. Every component was manufactured by a foreign power with its own intelligence agenda. China has remote access to the ground stations. Cuba processes the intelligence through Havana. Russia modernizes Cuban surveillance. Iran manufactures the fiber that carries the data.
And when the US decided to act, all of it — every Chinese radar, every Russian missile system, every CANTV-managed network — failed in a single night.
The designed fallback was the oldest technology in the stack: high-frequency radio. Ionospheric propagation. Wire antennas. Morse code-era physics. Though there are claims even HF was disrupted during the raid — whether through wide-spectrum jamming or command paralysis — the 130+ frequencies documented in this investigation remain the only communications system the Venezuelan military has that cannot be cyber-attacked, cannot be taken offline by a power grid hack, and cannot be controlled by any foreign power.
The frequencies are all documented. The call signs are all mapped. The networks are all identified.
Everything the Venezuelan military says on HF radio is audible to anyone with a $30 SDR dongle and a piece of wire.
This report is based entirely on open-source intelligence (OSINT). No classified information was accessed. No unauthorized systems were penetrated. Every frequency, call sign, coordinate, and technical detail documented here was obtained from publicly available sources.
Compiled: March 2026
Classification: OSINT — Open Source